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Introduction: Immigration Law and
Policy in the 1990s
Peter H. Schuck*
Immigration will shape America's future even more than it has
shaped her past and present. Consider the following facts:
* During the decade of the 1980s, some 5.8 million people will
have been admitted to the United States for legal permanent resi-
dence, and some 2.7 million more who had resided here illegally
will have been legalized under the various amnesty provisions of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).' The total of
approximately 8.5 million will far exceed the 4.5 million admitted
during the 197 0s and will approach the almost 8.8 million who came
here during the first decade of this century when immigration was
essentially unrestricted and at the highest levels ever.2
* Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (100 Stat.) 3359 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of titles 7, 8, 26, 42, and 50 of the U.S. Code). The legal
immigration figures in the text are extrapolated from United States Department ofJus-
tice, 1987 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, table 1
[hereinafter 1987 Statistical Yearbook]. For the number of legalizations, see infra text
accompanying notes 45 & 55. These figures do not take into account emigration from
the United States. The Census Bureau estimates that approximately 160,000 United
States citizens and legal permanent residents leave the country each year to live else-
where. Telephone interview with Robert Warren, Chief, Statistical Analysis Branch, INS
(Dec. 9, 1988). Other estimates of emigration from the United States are somewhat
higher. See R. Warren, The Elusive Exodus (1985) (on file with author).
2. 1987 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 1, at table 1. If we include illegal migrants
who came during the 1980s but who will not be legalized, the total greatly exceeds that
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* That turn-of-the-century influx was distinguished from earlier
ones not only by its size but also by its geographical and ethnic
sources within Europe. The migration of the 1980s, in contrast, has
been for the most part from every part of the world except Europe. s
* Current immigration is transforming the demographic profile
of the American population, particularly in large cities and in the
Sunbelt region. The minority groups, especially Hispanics, from
which most of the newer legal migrants come have high fertility
rates relative to the population generally and will account for much
of America's future population growth.4 Immigrants tend to be
younger than the population generally and more than two-thirds are
now women and children, in sharp contrast to the adult male-domi-
nated waves of immigration of the past. 5 Six states-California,
New York, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, and Illinois-were the in-
tended residence of more than 71% of legal immigrants in 1987;
more than one-fourth planned to live in California, concentrated in
six metropolitan areas in the state. 6
* Immigration is also transforming our social institutions and
practices. Widespread anxiety about linguistic and cultural frag-
mentation has prompted referenda establishing English as the offi-
cial language in California and some other states. Bilingual
education is a major curricular issue in public education, and dozens
of languages must be used in New York City schools. The influence
of Hispanic and Asian voters is growing. Certain sectors of the
economy now essentially depend almost wholly upon legal and ille-
gal immigrant workers.
* The politics of immigration have grown ever more complex and
intense, while the pace of immigration policy formation has greatly
accelerated. After enacting the Johnson Act of 1921, 7 it took Con-
gress over 30 years to move to the McCarran-Walters Act of 1952,8
13 more years to abandon the national origins-based quota system,9
historic high. See infra note 50 for a recent estimate of the number who remain in illegal
status. Many of them, of course, came before the 1980s.
3. European countries accounted for slightly over 10% of all legal admissions during
1987 and about 8% of the new arrivals that year. Id. at table 6.
4. Study Sees Shift in U.S. Population, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1983, at A10.
5. On age distribution, see 1987 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 1, at chart C. On
women and children, see Pear, Men Only Third of U.S. Immigrants, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,
1985, at B21 (summarizing Labor Department study).
6. 1987 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 1, at xxi-xxii.
7. Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5 (1921).
8. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
9. Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
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and 13 more to eliminate the hemispheric quotas in favor of a sin-
gle, world-wide quota.' 0 Just since 1980, in contrast, Congress has
enacted the first comprehensive regulation of refugee and asylum
admissions, " a sweeping set of measures directed at the problem of
illegal migration,' 2 and a far-reaching scheme for the prevention of
admissions based upon so-called "sham" marriages.' 3 Moreover, it
will almost certainly adopt a fundamental restructuring of the entire
system of legal immigration before the decade ends.14
* During the 1980s, a cosmopolitan legal culture began to per-
meate the parochial bureaucratic culture of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) as never before. For reasons not alto-
gether clear, immigration law is shedding its shadowy reputation as
a backwater legal specialty, of interest largely to marginal, low-status
practitioners and the INS.15 More lawyers of demonstrated profes-
sional competence and high repute have been attracted to the pri-
vate, "public interest," and government sectors of immigration
practice. Some of the elite law schools are offering academic and
clinical courses in immigration law for the first time.' 6 Legal schol-
ars have begun to scrutinize the INS and immigration law more
carefully. 17 Most important, the federal courts are now intimately
involved in supervising the INS's administration of the immigration
10. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907.
11. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
12. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, supra note 1.
13. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-639, 100 Stat.
3537. The constitutionality of certain provisions of this statute is under challenge in a
number of federal courts. See, e.g., Azizi v. Meese, Civ. No. H-87-957 (AHN) (D. Conn.
1988) (complaint filed). For a discussion of constitutional and other issues concerning
the.Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments (IMFA), see Tucker, Assimilation to the
United States: A Study of the Adjustment of Status and the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Statutes, 7 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 20 (1989).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 70-72.
15. See Trillin, Making Adjustments, The New Yorker, May 28, 1984, at 50. This
reputation doubtless was undeserved in many cases and probably says as much about
the values of the elite corporate lawyers who increasingly shape the profession's self-
image as it does about the quality of the services that immigration lawyers actually
render to their clients. As leading corporate law firms increase their immigration prac-
tices, we can expect that the reputation of immigration lawyers will improve, quite apart
from whether the quality of their services does so.
16. The legal academy's new interest in immigration law and policy was reflected in,
and facilitated by, two developments: the establishment in 1984 of an Immigration Law
Section in the Association of American Law Schools and the publication of several immi-
gration law casebooks. See T. Aleinikoff & D. Martin, Immigration: Process and Policy
(1985); A. Leibowitz, Immigration Law and Refugee Policy (1983).
17. Some of these academic efforts were facilitated and supported by the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, which commissioned a number of studies of
immigration-related issues. See, e.g., Legomsky, A Research Agenda for Immigration
Law: A Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, 25 San Diego L.
Rev. 227 (1988); Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A
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laws. As a growing number of immigration cases have reached the
federal courts in recent years,' 8 the courts have invalidated statutory
provisions and INS procedures and policies with an alacrity that
would have astonished the immigration lawyers of an earlier
generation.' 9
In the remainder of this Overview, I shall explore the significance
of these developments for the future. First, I describe the main ele-
ments of the setting in which immigration law and policy must now
be formulated. Second, I summarize what is known about the ef-
fects of IRCA. Finally, I speculate about the shape of immigration
law and policy in the 1990s.
I. The Setting for Immigration Law and Policy
It is conventional to ascribe the patterns of legal and illegal migra-
tion to a combination of "push" and "pull" factors. Clearly, the
conditions propelling people toward the United States have never
been stronger. Population pressures in the Third World,20 most no-
tably in nearby Latin America, are building rapidly. The labor force
in Latin America alone will grow by more than 90 million workers
between the years 1980 and 2000. This increase of 77% will make it
virtually impossible to maintain even the dismal current levels of
employment prevailing there.2' In addition, convulsive civil con-
flicts in Central America and other immigration source regions,
such as Southeast Asia, have swollen the number of refugees to an
estimated 14 million worldwide.22 At the same time, inexpensive
Study of the Immigration Process, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1297 (1986); Verkuil, A Study of
Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 1141 (1984).
18. Data on immigration cases proceeding directly from the INS to the courts of
appeals are presented in Schuck & Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law (draft report to the Administrative Conference of the United
States) (in preparation 1989).
19. See Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1984).
For the most recent and perhaps most unusual example of court involvement see Ameri-
can-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, Civ. No. 87-2107-SVW (C.D. Cal., Dec.
22, 1988) (invalidating several provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act on
constitutional grounds).
20. I refer to the "Third World" rather than to the "developing countries" because
the economies in some of those counties are actually shrinking rather than expanding.
21. M. Teitelbaum, Latin Migration North: The Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy 28
(1985). For unemployment and migration data and projections for the Caribbean Basin,
see T. Espenshade, Projected Imbalances Between Labor Supply and Labor Demand in
the Caribbean Basin: Implications for Future Migration to the United States, Urban
Inst. Pub. PDS-88-2 (June 1988).
22. I use the term "refugee" here not in its strict, statutory sense, 8 U.S.C.
§ 110 1(a)(42) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), but in the somewhat broader sense used by in-
ternational organizations that compile aggregate statistics on refugees. Telephone in-
terview with Virginia Hamilton, U.S. Comm. for Refugees (Dec. 1988).
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transportation has made it much easier for hundreds of thousands
of these desperate individuals to reach our borders, where many of
them claim asylum. 23 "Pull" factors attracting migration to the
United States include the expanding employment opportunities for
unskilled labor, the improved prospects for attaining legal status re-
alized in the 1986 legislation, and the critical mass of compatriots
that has accumulated in the ethnic enclaves of urban America, espe-
cially in Sunbelt communities.
Although most of these migrants are undocumented-and will be
unable to establish valid asylum claims or other legal grounds for
permanent residence here-legal immigration has also grown stead-
ily during the 1980s. Indeed, this growth in legal immigration is
occurring without any increase in the numerical quotas,2 4 and the
total may soon equal or exceed record turn-of-the-century levels.
Several "pull factors" are contributing to this increase. First, Asians
and some other beneficiaries of the 1965 reforms that abolished the
system of national origins quotas have naturalized at relatively high
rates. Naturalization enables them legally to bring their immediate
relatives to the United States without regard to quota limitations, a
process known as "chain migration." 25 Second, more than 2.5 mil-
lion undocumented migrants will be granted temporary legal status
under IRCA's general, agricultural, and Cuban-Haitian amnesty
programs. These individuals must either adjust to permanent legal
residence status within a prescribed period of time or face deporta-
tion. Finally, refugee and parole admissions are likely to increase to
accommodate the larger number of Jews, Armenians, and others
who are being permitted to leave the Soviet Union,26 as well as
23. See, e.g., Schmalz, Nicaraguans Crowd the Miami Welcome Mat, N.Y. Times, Nov.
20, 1988, § 1, at 1 (rapidly growing influx of Nicaraguans); Applebome, South Texas
Fears Big Buildup of Aliens, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1988, at A22 (almost 2,000 asylum
petitions now being filed each week with INS; 60,736 asylum petitions filed with INS in
fiscal 1988, compared with 26,107 in 1987 and 18,889 in 1986). These figures on asy-
lum petitions presumably do not include the thousands of asylum claims filed with immi-
gration judges in the context of exclusion or deportation proceedings.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The annual worldwide numerical
quota is 270,000, but this figure does not include immediate relatives, "special immi-
grants," or refugees.
25. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
26. See, e.g., Gordon, U.S. to Ease Backlog In Soviet Emigration, But Draws Criti-
cism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1988, at AI (Attorney General will make extraordinary use of
parole authority to admit thousands of non-refugee Armenian and Jewish emigres);
Meissner, 'Refugee' Is a Misnomer for Soviet Armenian Emigres, L.A. Times, June 8,
1988, § 2, at 7. A person admitted under the parole authority of the Attorney General is
physically permitted within the borders of the United States but is not legally admitted,
and remains subject to exclusion proceedings at the discretion of the Attorney General.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982). See generally Leng Mey Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
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Nicaraguan "contras" whose efforts to gain refugee status may re-
ceive an especially sympathetic hearing in the Bush
administration. 27
The 1980s have taught us just how difficult it is to control the
harsh pressures and magnetic opportunities that drive migratory
flows of this size. Immigration law and policy are not entirely help-
less in the face of such powerful motivations; they affect the incen-
tives and expectations of aliens and citizens while providing officials
with enforcement resources. On the other hand, we must not exag-
gerate the effectiveness of either law or policy in the immigration
context. Both are severely limited by the forces favoring increased
migration and by the real constraints of the enforcement system.
As a formal and as a practical matter, the conduct of immigration
officials is relatively unconstrained by the law. The immigration
statute confers exceedingly broad discretion upon the INS, which
conducts its activities under the aegis of the Attorney General, ordi-
narily a close friend of the President. Bureaucratic self-absorption
and autonomy are consequences of the striking insularity of the INS.
The INS's autonomy has been reinforced in recent years by the
Supreme Court's insistence that lower courts defer to the agency's
interpretation of its own statutory authority. 28 Despite much criti-
cism, the State Department's consular visa decisions remain virtually
immune from judicial review. 29 Approximately 98% of deporta-
tions, and presumably an even higher percentage of exclusions, are
effected without formal proceedings of any kind.3 0 The agency's in-
formal operating norms, particularly those of the paramilitary Bor-
der Patrol, are deeply ingrained and highly resistant to change. 3'
One authoritative measure of this long-standing resistance to law
is the series of harsh indictments of INS policies and conduct that
federal courts have rendered during the 1980s. 32 Although the
courts' condemnations might seem to contradict the claim that the
27. Pear, U.S. Vows to Take Contras Off Honduras's Hands, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1,
1988, § 1, at 3.
28. Cf Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984). But see, I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (rejecting INS's
interpretation).
29. E.g., Li Hing of Hong Kong v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1986).
30. E. Harwood, In Liberty's Shadow: Illegal Aliens and Immigration Law Enforce-
ment 43 (1986).
31. See Harwood, supra note 30; informal remarks of Doris Meissner, Senior Associ-
ate, Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, at Yale Law School (May 2, 1988).
32. Schuck, supra note 19 (discussing and citing cases); Orantes-Hernandez v.
Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (invalidating INS voluntary departure proce-
dures for detained Salvadorans).
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INS is relatively autonomous and recalcitrant, I believe that they
confirm it by demonsirating the persistence and systematic nature of
INS lawlessness. It is still too early to conclude that even these judi-
cial interventions will succeed in actually conforming the agency's
behavior to the law's requirements.
Immigration law's limited effectiveness is paralleled by immigra-
tion policy's limited options. The number and character of the con-
straints under which Congress and the INS operate are so confining
that it is only a slight exaggeration to say that all policy innovations
that would be politically, fiscally, and administratively practicable
have already been tried. If they are found wanting, a verdict that
seems a bit premature given the limited data on the results of the
1986 reforms, one is hard-pressed to devise promising policy
alternatives.
The major constraint on immigration policy is public attitudes.
Contemporary commentators on immigration issues agree that
American society harbors ambivalent feelings toward aliens. On the
one hand, we think of ourselves, on both a mythic and an emotional
level, as a nation of immigrants. We take pride in that communal
identity and invoke it as a source of national self-respect. On the
other hand, Americans-like all people throughout history-fear
strangers and perceive them as threats to settled routines and cher-
ished values, especially if the strangers are poor and ethnically or
linguistically distinct.
This ambivalence also assumes two other forms. First, we distin-
guish between good aliens and bad aliens.33 Good aliens come here
openly and legally. They are hard-working, family-oriented people
who add to our national wealth and social diversity. Bad aliens, in
contrast, come here surreptitiously and illegally. They demand pub-
lic benefits and services but have no intention of assimilating. When
they work, they take jobs away from American citizens and legal im-
migrants. During periods of prosperity, we welcome good aliens
and do not trouble too much about bad ones. During recessions or
other periods of high social anxiety, we blur the distinction and
evince hostility toward all of them.
Second, we distinguish between the aliens whom we know person-
ally as friends, colleagues, employees, students, neighbors, or res-
taurateurs, and those who do not enter our lives in any visible or
33. Professor Aleinikoff has analyzed the Supreme Court's recent immigration deci-
sions according to this distinction. Aleinikoff, Good Aliens, Bad Aliens, and the
Supreme Court, in 9 In Defense of the Alien 46 (1987).
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palpable way. Americans, sociologist Edwin Harwood has sug-
gested, respond favorably to immigrants as people. This sympathy
creates political difficulties for the INS when it seeks to deport them.
"IT]he deportable alien," Harwood notes, "is likely to have many
more defenders who want to help him stay than antagonists who
want to see him leave."'3 4
Americans' ambivalence about immigrants was perhaps most viv-
idly revealed in the long congressional struggle over the proposals
to control illegal migration, which were finally enacted in 1986 as
IRCA. IRCA was adopted only after almost a decade of intensive,
highly visible public debate punctuated by several bills that passed
one or both houses by razor-thin margins only to die without final
approval. When IRCA did pass, it did so only in the waning hours
of the 99th Congress, after an exceedingly fragile compromise was
stitched together, and then only by a very slender margin in the
House.3 5 Few legislators are anxious to revisit that bloody battle-
field soon. These political factors, mediated through the Congress,
also constrain the INS policymakers, as the agency's currently un-
successful efforts to adopt stringent new regulations on asylum pro-
cedures and other policy initiatives show.36
The political stalemate reflects more than ambivalent public atti-
tudes, a sharply divided Congress, and a gun-shy INS. The eco-
nomic effects of immigration to the United States are not entirely
clear or consistent. Legal immigration is almost certainly beneficial
in all respects. Legal immigrants tend to be better educated than
the American public in general,37 and they must already have firm
family ties or meet labor market needs here in order to qualify for
admission. But the educational levels of illegal aliens, including
those being legalized under IRCA, are much lower. Futhermore,
specialists intensely disagree about the economic impact of illegal
migration.
Some analysts emphasize that undocumented workers fill jobs
that Americans are anxious to have performed but are unwilling to
34. Harwood, Alienation: American Attitudes Toward Immigration, Public Opinion
June/July 1983, at 49, 51.
35. Pear, House Approves Immigration Bill Considered Dead Two Weeks Ago, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al (final House vote 230 to 166; crucial amendment to elimi-
nate legalization provision defeated by only seven votes, 199 to 192).
36. Helton, Proposed Regulations on Asylum: An Improvement or Retrogression?,
Nat'l LJ., Feb. 8, 1988, at 18; Helton, Asylum Rules Revisited: An Analysis, 65 Inter-
preter Releases 367 (1988).
37. Chiswick, A Troubling Drop in Immigrant 'Quality,' N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1986,
§ 3, at 3.
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accept themselves; that they pay payroll and sales taxes but do not
generally seek public assistance or collect Social Security; that their
spending power increases total employment and output; and that
they are enthusiastic, productive workers who enable certain margi-
nal industries to survive foreign competition. Other analysts stress
that regardless of the effect of undocumented aliens on the national
economy, their most important impacts are felt in a small number of
urban enclaves where they are concentrated. There, these analysts
say, they compete with and displace vulnerable minority group
workers; generate high unemployment compensation costs; impose
heavy demands upon schools, hospitals and other public services;
weaken labor unions; encourage employers to violate fair labor stan-
dards; and delay the introduction of more efficient technology in
certain industries. Thus, policy advocates on all sides of an immi-
gration issue can and do invoke provocative but ultimately inconclu-
sive studies to buttress their positions.3 8
Policy options are also constrained by the severely limited re-
sources available for immigration enforcement. The INS's budget
($800 million for fiscal 1989) has grown substantially in recent
years.39 This growth is especially striking in light of the fiscal con-
straints occasioned by the federal deficit. But the adequacy of INS
resources must not be appraised in comparison with previous
budget levels, which were traditionally very low, but in light of the
growing pressures of legal and illegal migration and the consequent
demands on the agency. The great bulk of recent INS budget in-
creases has been earmarked for the Border Patrol. The amounts
available for interior enforcement operations, immigration adjudica-
tion, education and training, and other important functions con-
tinue to be quite restricted.
II. The Effects of IRCA
In a sense it is idle to speak of new immigration policy initiatives
when Congress and the INS already have their hands so full imple-
menting the IRCA reforms, adopted just two years ago and only
now beginning to be implemented by the agency. The shape of im-
migration law and policy in the 1990s will depend upon whether the
public and policymakers perceive the IRCA reforms to be operating
38. For a discussion of this problem, see Muller, Immigration Policy and Economic
Growth, 7 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 101 (1989).
39. See Congress Approves INS Funding Bill, 65 Interpreter Releases 1014 (1988).
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effectively. Although it is still too early to reach definitive judg-
ments on the question of IRCA's effectiveness-indeed, it is difficult
even to formulate a definition of effectiveness-it may nevertheless
be useful to consider its performance to date.
IRCA was omnibus legislation that adopted four major new pro-
grams. These programs concern (1) the legalization of aliens who
had entered the United States prior to January 1, 1982, and resided
here in unlawful status since that date (general legalization); (2) the
agricultural labor provisions; (3) the imposition of civil and criminal
penalties on employers of illegal workers (employer sanctions); and
(4) the prohibition of employment discrimination based upon na-
tional origin or citizenship status (antidiscrimination). 40 As of this
writing, these programs are at various stages of implementation.
A. General Legalization
The first phase of the legalization program, during which aliens
could apply for lawful temporary resident status, ended on May 5,
1988. 4 1 The INS recently issued regulations to govern the second
phase, during which aliens who have been granted temporary status
must either apply for lawful permanent resident status within a cer-
tain period,42 or revert to undocumented and hence deportable sta-
tus. 43 In order to qualify for permanent status, and thus become
eligible for eventual citizenship, they must demonstrate "basic citi-
zenship skills" either by passing INS examinations on English and
on American history and government, or by "satisfactorily pursuing
a course of study" that will lead to such knowledge. 44
40. For a description of each of these programs, see The Simpson-Rodino Act Ana-
lyzed: Part I-Employer Sanctions, 63 Interpreter Releases 991 (1986); Part II-Legali-
zation, 63 Interpreter Releases 1021 (1986); Part III-The Anti Discrimination
Provisions, 63 Interpreter Releases 1049 (1986); Part IV-The Agricultural Worker Pro-
visions, 63 Interpreter Releases 1127 (1986).
41. By court order entered in at least one case, that deadline was extended for those
aliens who had failed to apply within the statutory time period because of INS eligibility
regulations that the court found to be improperly restrictive. See Ayuda v. Meese, 687 F.
Supp. 650, 651 (D.D.C. 1988) (Supplemental Order No. VII, "known to the Govern-
ment" regulations).
42. An alien must apply for this adjustment during the one-year period beginning
eighteen months after the grant of lawful temporary resident status. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The deadline for applications expires on Novem-
ber 4, 1990.
43. Applicant Processing for the Legalization Program; Conforming Amendments,
53 Fed. Reg. 43,984 (1988) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 100, 103, 264, 299).
44. Controversy has already erupted over how these education requirements are to
be met. See Education Requirement Seen as Snag to Program for Aliens, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 7, 1988, at A14 (many applicants will be unable to enroll in overcrowded English
and civics classes).
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More than 1.75 million aliens applied for amnesty under the gen-
eral legalization program, and it is expected that almost all of
them-perhaps as many as 1.7 million-will ultimately receive it.4 5
Virtually all of the legalization applicants come from a few Latin
American countries; almost 75% are Mexicans, and only four other
countries (El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, and the Philippines) sup-
plied more than 1% of the total.46 Despite some major missteps,
including INS misinterpretations of the IRCA statute, 47 the agency
has generally received high marks for its implementation of the pro-
gram's first phase.48
Pressures are already building, however, to establish a second am-
nesty program.49 Millions of undocumented workers continue to
live and work here under the same troubling circumstances that ne-
cessitated the original amnesty. 50 Many of these individuals, some
of whom are immediate relatives of legalized aliens, were statutorily
ineligible for amnesty either because they arrived after the January
1, 1982, cutoff date or were ineligible for some other reason. Many
others might have been eligible but failed to apply out of ignorance,
distrust of the INS, erroneous interpretations of the statute, finan-
cial barriers, or apathy.
B. Agricultural Labor
In the long debate over immigration reform during the 1970s and
1980s, the agricultural labor provisions became the key element in
45. Telephone interview with David S. North, Transcentury (Dec. 9, 1988). These
estimates were current as of December 6, 1988. They represent the number of applica-
tions filed and a current approval rate of 97%.
46. D. Meissner & D. Papademetriou, The Legalization Countdown: A Third Quar-
ter Assessment 89 (Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, Feb. 1988).
47. E.g., Catholic Social Services v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (in-
validating INS regulations defining "brief, casual and innocent" absences); Ayuda v.
Meese, 687 F. Supp. at 651 (invalidating INS regulations defining "known to the Gov-
ernment"); Zambrano v. I.N.S., Civ. No. S-88-455 (EJG) (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1988) (invali-
dating INS regulations defining "public charge").
48. See, e.g., D. Meissner & D. Papademetriou, supra note 46; Avocha, Amnesty's Gate
to Swing Shut This Week for Illegal Aliens, Wash. Post, May 2, 1988, at Al; D. North &
A. Portz, Through the Maze: An Interim Report on the Alien Legalization Program 12-
14 (Transcentury Development Associates, Mar. 1988).
49. See FAIR, Immigration Report,June 1988, at 2 (INS circulating proposal for sec-
ond amnesty to include 200,000 ineligible relatives of newly-legalized aliens; several
members of Congress will introduce new amnesty legislation).
50. See generally Note, Compromising Immigration Reform: The Creation of a Vul-
nerable Subclass, 98 Yale LJ. 409 (1988). The INS estimates that there are between 1.5
million and 3 million illegal aliens living in the United States today, not including the
more than 2.5 million who will receive amnesty under IRCA. In early 1987, before
IRCA really took effect, the number was estimated at between 4 million and 5 million.
Telephone interview with Robert Warren, supra note 1.
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the political compromise that finally made IRCA possible by assur-
ing a reliable labor supply to western growers. Although special im-
migration programs addressed to the need for agricultural labor
had been on the books for forty years, IRCA made three major
changes. First, it revised and expanded the H-2 program for admit-
ting temporary workers to perform agricultural work. Second, it
permitted aliens who had worked here on perishable commodities
for a specified period of time prior to May 1, 1986, to apply for
temporary legal resident status as "special agricultural workers"
(SAWs). 51 Third, it authorized the entrance of additional "replen-
ishment agricultural workers" (RAWs) as temporary residents after
1990 if a farm labor shortage develops. Both SAWs and RAWs may
become eligible for permanent residence status.
The SAW program, which was negotiated by a handful of people
without hearings, studies, or much debate,52 has become the wild
card in the IRCA deck. Its eligibility, benefit, and evidentiary provi-
sions are far more liberal.than those in the general legalization pro-
gram; and its relatively lax documentation requirements have led to
persistent allegations of widespread fraud, some of which have been
substantiated. 53 No reliable data on the number of SAW eligibles
existed when IRCA was enacted. Although the INS expected about
600,000 farm workers to apply, more than 1.1 million had done so
by the time the application period closed on November 30, 1988;
more than half of them were in California. 54 Given the way the pro-
gram is designed, the vast majority of these applications are likely to
51. The program divides SAWs into two groups. Group 1 SAWs comprise up to
350,000 aliens who worked for the requisite 90-day period during each of the preceding
three years. Group 2 SAWs need only have worked at least 90 days during the year
beginning May 1, 1986. Group 1 SAWs become eligible for permanent status sooner
than Group 2 SAWs. IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, title III, part A, 100 Stat. 3359, 3411-34
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. & 26 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1986)).
52. Mattingly, Fraud Suspected in Farm Jobs Program, 20 Nat'lJ. 2410 (1988). The
article quotes Philip Martin, an agricultural labor and immigration expert who consulted
with Congress in the development of the SAW program, describing it as "probably the
least thought-out piece of legislation that's ever been drafted." Id.
53. See, e.g., Applebome, Farm Law Abused by Illegal Aliens, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17,
1988, at AI; U.S. Amnesty Ends for Farm Workers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1988, at A25;
Mattingly, supra note 52; FAIR, Information Exchange, Oct. 1988. The government has
also interpreted eligibility requirements quite broadly; for example, it has defined labor
on perishable crops to include the harvesting of clarinet reeds and the shaping of Christ-
mas trees. See memorandum from David S. North (July 18, 1988), in FAIR, supra, at 5.
54. Telephone interview with David S. North, supra note 45; U.S. Amnesty Ends for
Farm Workers, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1988, at A25.
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be granted.55 Beginning in 1990, this number will be further en-
larged by the influx and eventual legalization of RAWs, who can be
brought into the United States to replace the many SAWs who will
have left the agricultural sector for more remunerative, less arduous
work.
C. Employer Sanctions
The centerpiece of IRCA's immigration control policy is the em-
ployer sanctions program. Modeled on similar programs in some
states and foreign countries, employer sanctions were intended to
eliminate the principal "pull" factor attracting undocumented
workers to the United States. The program was also designed to
economize on scarce INS enforcement resources by conscripting
employers and recruitment and referral agencies to perform the task
of verifying employees' identities and authorization to work.
Implementation of the employer sanctions provision is far from
being either complete or effective. More than a year after IRCA's
enactment, employer noncompliance due to ignorance and other
reasons remained widespread: an estimated 22% of the employers
were not aware of the law; many more did not clearly understand
one or more of IRCA's major provisions; and half of those who were
aware of the law and had hired one or more employees under it had
failed to complete the verification documents required for those
hires. 56 Unauthorized workers' use of counterfeit documents also
appeared to be rampant. 57
It is difficult, if not impossible, to appraise the effectiveness of em-
ployer sanctions in reducing unauthorized alien employment and
55. As of November 28, 1988, 93% of the SAW applications that had been acted
upon were granted, although a significant number of suspected fraudulent applications
.were still pending. 65 Interpreter Releases 1257 (1988). In addition, litigation over-
turning the INS's administration of the program may increase even this high success rate
among aliens. E.g., Haitian Refugee Center v. Nelson, 694 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(invalidating INS's standard of proof for adjudicating SAW applications); United Farm
Workers of America v. I.N.S., Civ. No. S-87-1064-LKK/JFM (E.D. Cal., Nov. 17, 1988)
(upholding INS's demand for corroborating evidence but liberally defining "corroborat-
ing documentation").
56. The United States General Accounting Office conducted a survey of employers
in late 1987 and early 1988. General Accounting Office, Immigration Reform: Status of
Implementing Employer Sanctions After Second Year, Pub. No. B-125051, at 22 (1988).
57. The GAO estimated that 39% of the employed unauthorized aliens used or were
suspected of using counterfeit documents. The other 61% failed to complete the re-
quired forms. Id. at 30.
Yale Law & Policy Review
migration. INS enforcement activity has not yet reached a signifi-
cant level. 58 Quite apart from that fact, however, one cannot readily
determine how many did not migrate or were not hired because
of the sanctions' existence. And much fraud in documenting em-
ployment authorization and identification doubtless goes unde-
tected. The effectiveness question will probably always remain
unanswerable. 59
D. Antidiscrimination
In the debates over IRCA, many groups predicted that the new
law's employer sanctions would encourage employers to discrimi-
nate againstjob applicants, especially Hispanics, whose national ori-
gin or citizenship status made them more likely, as a statistical
matter, to be undocumented. These groups also argued that ex-
isting remedies for such discrimination, notably Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196460 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981,61 were inade-
quate. To mollify them and address their concerns, IRCA estab-
lished a Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair
Employment Practices in the Justice Department, which was empow-
ered to investigate and prosecute claims that employers, referrers or
recruiters had engaged in such discrimination.
The anti-discrimination provisions generated a storm of contro-
versy literally before the ink on the new law was dry. In signing
IRCA, President Reagan stated that complainants would have to
prove employers' discriminatory intent, not just discriminatory ef-
fects, in order to invoke the new remedies. 62 In the regulations im-
plementing these provisions, the Justice Department reaffirmed that
58. As of October 20, 1988, the INS had issued 720 notices of intent to fine busi-
nesses for employer sanctions violations, mostly in service industries in the South and
West. Only a few criminal prosecutions have been initiated; the first guilty plea was
entered on November 2, 1988. Recent Developments: Employer Sanctions Turn Seri-
ous With Criminal Fines, Housekeeper Case, 65 Interpreter Releases 1227, 1228 (1988).
59. GAO, supra note 56, at 65-71. One very imperfect measure of effectiveness-
alien apprehensions per 10-hour shift on the Border Patrol linewatch-suggests that
illegal border crossings decreased after IRCA. Id. at 66-67. This apparent decrease
might be due to a number of factors other than employer sanctions, such as the effect of
the legalization programs.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
62. See Pear, Immigration Law Sets Off Dispute Over Job Rights for Legal Aliens,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at AI.
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position.63 The coverage of the new law is also the subject of litiga-
tion; in the first decided case, a court has ruled that aliens who have
not applied for amnesty are not protected by the new provisions. 64
The extent of actual job discrimination resulting from the em-
ployer sanctions remains a matter of some dispute. In November
1988, several government agencies issued reports on this question.
Governor Cuomo's Task Force on Immigration Affairs found that
some New York employers were refusing to accept legally valid
proof of residency, denying employment to those who experience
minor delays in gathering documentation of status, and screening
out applicants who look or sound foreign. 65 Testimony to that ef-
fect was also heard by New York City's Commission on Human
Rights. 66 On the other hand, the United States General Accounting
Office concluded from a survey it conducted in early 1988 that no
pattern of discrimination caused by employer sanctions had been
established, although it did find widespread violations. 67
IlL Immigration in the 1990s
In certain respects, the challenges confronting immigration law
and policy in the 1990s can be readily predicted. One set of con-
cerns grows out of IRCA's effects upon the administration of immi-
gration enforcement generally, quite apart from how the
legalization, employer sanctions, and antidiscrimination programs
are implemented. The INS's adjudication burdens will grow as
IRCA, which essentially deputizes millions of employers as immigra-
tion enforcers, generates a large volume of new cases and novel
legal claims. Now that the period for legalization application has
ended, the INS will presumably return to its traditional enforcement
activities with an aggressiveness no longer restrained, as it has been
since IRCA became effective, by concerns that alien mistrust of the
agency might thwart the success of the legalization programs.
63. 52 Fed. Reg. 37,402 (1987).
64. Romo v. Todd, EOIR #87200001 (decided Aug. 19, 1988), in Immigration
Pol'y & L., Sept. 22, 1988, at 5-6.
65. Howe, Study Says Immigration Law Is Leading to Discrimination, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 5, 1988, at AI.
66. Howe, Immigration Law Said to Harm U.S. Citizens, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988,
§ 1, at 53.
67. Study Hints Job Bias Against the Foreign-Looking, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988,
§ 1, at 27. The Special Counsel for Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices
noted a steady increase in discrimination charges filed under the new provisions,
although the total number is still not large. Id. For the GAO findings, see supra note 56,
at 59.
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IRCA also alters the incentives of undocumented workers-who are
already working here. With employer sanctions now in place, those
who have worked for the same employer since November 1986 have
a much more powerful reason to resist deportation than they did
before: once they are deported, they cannot readily return to the
United States and recover their old jobs or find new ones, as they
previously could. If they leave their pre-IRCA jobs, by reason of
deportation or otherwise, they lose their "grandfather" status and
become legally unemployable. IRCA, of course, was designed to
create just such a dilemma for them. But if a large number of un-
documented workers apprehended by the INS respond by demand-
ing formal deportation hearings instead of simply accepting
voluntary departure as almost all now do, the INS's adjudicatory
process may grind to a halt, seriously weakening the credibility of
the agency's enforcement posture.
Illegal migration, then, will continue to haunt our immigration
policy. Even if IRCA's combination of legalization and employer
sanctions reduces the number of aliens living and working in the
United States illegally, that number will still be large. Moreover, the
rigors of employer sanctions and the growing impatience of a public
that grudgingly approved the legalization program will surely exac-
erbate the very conditions and abuses that originally made such a
program necessary. Whatever Congress and the INS may say now,
the possibility of another amnesty cannot be ruled out. Yet the
prospect of a new round will attract still more illegal migrants. Per-
haps more important, IRCA's legalization of approximately 2.7 mil-
lion individuals is certain to spawn large-scale chain migration by
their family members. Some of this migration will be illegal.
Future migratory flows to the United States are certain to inten-
sify for other reasons as well. I have already noted the most impor-
tant causes: the explosive demographic, economic, political, and
military pressures that are propelling people here.68 These pres-
sures, however, will be greatly magnified by restrictions on the entry
of asylum seekers that have recently been instituted by Canada,
France, West Germany, and other countries that traditionally wel-
comed refugees.6 9 These restrictions reflect anxieties and political
68. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
69. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Republic of France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 183 (1984);
Haberman, Africans Find Italy's Doors Swinging Shut, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1988, at
A15; Hazarika, India's Assam State Demanding Ban on Migration, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13,
1987, § 1, at 12; Martin, Refugee Problem Perplexing Canada, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23,
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values that may extend beyond the relatively narrow concern about
possible abuses of the asylum process, thus aggravating a more gen-
eral (but often latent) hostility to all immigrants. Many would-be
migrants to these countries will respond to the new barriers by seek-
ing to enter the United States instead.
Another set of challenges concerns the reform of legal immigra-
tion. Several issues are especially pressing. The first involves the
level of immigration that should be permitted in the future. There
seems little doubt that the United States could readily absorb legal
immigration well above current levels. Declining overall fertility
rates, looming labor shortages, the aging of the population, and the
social and economic dynamism associated with population growth
all argue strongly for additional immigration. So long as illegal mi-
gration seems out of control, however, the case for larger quotas
will be difficult to sustain politically. Thus, much will depend upon
IRCA's perceived effectiveness.
Even more far-reaching than the issue of what level should be per-
mitted is the issue of which immigrants should be favored, assuming
that the demand for visas continues vastly to exceed the supply. Re-
cently, a remarkable bipartisan consensus seems to have formed
around the principle that the existing preference system, which
reserves approximately 90% of the numerical quotas for family
members, 70 should be replaced by a new system that, while preserv-
ing priority for family unification, accords greater weight to labor
market considerations. Although the details and numbers remain
controversial, Congress will probably adopt a point system that fa-
vors would-be "independent" or "new seed" immigrants who pos-
sess desired occupational, educational, and English language skills
but lack preferential family links in the United States. 7' This devel-
opment, which would also reduce or eliminate the present competi-
tion for visas between the family and economic categories while
increasing the total level of legal immigration, will be a welcome
one. The ceiling for refugee admissions, which has already been
1986, § 1, at 34 (growing public opposition to lenient admission of refugees); Anti-Im-
migrant Group on the Rise in Geneva, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985, § 1, at 8 (Switzerland
toughening policy on refugees); Nigerians Order 700,000 Aliens to Leave Country
Within a Week, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1985, at Al.
70. Because of other admissions outside the preference system, 72% of total legal
immigration in 1987 was family-related. Refugees constituted 16%, occupational pref-
erences 9%, and "other" 3%. These figures are based upon data in the 1987 Statistical
Yearbook, supra note 1, at table 4.
71. See, e.g., two such bills that were considered during the 100th Congress: S. 1611,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 5115, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) (as introduced).
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raised to 94,000 for fiscal year 1989, may have to be increased fur-
ther. This is especially likely if the Soviet Union decides to permit
large-scale emigration of Jews, Pentacostals, Armenians, and other
groups that may be attracted to resettlement in the United States
and enjoy strong political support here. 72
But some "reforms" are really throwbacks. Congress exemplified
this possibility recently when it extended and enlarged what had
previously been characterized as a "one-time" special preference for
immigrants from those countries, notably the British Isles, that were
"adversely affected" by the 1965 law abolishing the system of na-
tional origins quotas. 73 This change-which reflects little more than
the political influence of Senator Kennedy, former Speaker of the
House Tip O'Neill, and Irish-Americans-is most unfortunate. It
represents a thinly-veiled return to that long-discredited system, al-
beit one that is limited in scope.
New social priorities will also shape immigration law and policy in
the 1990s. For example, Congress has begun to involve the INS
more deeply in the difficult task of drug enforcement.74 One can
readily predict that as public anxiety over the drug problem in-
creases, these demands on the INS will grow and will assume new
forms. Also, as multinational enterprises expand, the need for
greater mobility of labor across national borders will become more
evident. Public concerns about the United States' international
competitiveness will increase the pressures on the INS to overhaul
its cumbersome administrative machinery for the processing of non-
immigrant and labor preference visa petitioners.
In the 1990s, the backwater of immigration law will be pressed to
join the mainstream of contemporary public law. The long-term
project of domesticating immigration law is still in an embryonic
stage. During the 1980s, litigants, courts, and politicians have un-
dertaken systematic efforts to subject it to the kinds of constitutional
and administrative law norms and political controls that limit other
governmental threats to personal liberty. Yet these efforts, remark-
able as they are, have achieved only partial success. Important
hallmarks of immigration law's traditional insularity remain, such as
72. See supra text accompanying notes 26 & 27.
73. IRCA § 314 (NP-5 program), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-658, § 2, 102 Stat.
3908 (1988). The new law also created a "temporary" complement of 10,000 additional
slots for would-be immigrants from "underrepresented" countries. id. at § 3.
74. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-590, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
The immigration-related provisions of the Act are summarized at 65 Interpreter Re-
leases 1119-20 (1988).
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the refusal to accord excludable aliens constitutional protection, the
vagaries of the "entry doctrine," the insistence that deportation is
not punishment, and the Administrative Procedure Act's incomplete
applicability to immigration proceedings. Still, immigration law's
exceptionalism will be increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of
the rationalizing, universalizing, liberalizing dynamics of American
public law.
A final set of challenges concerns the future shape of American
society. The high fertility rates of the relatively young, newly-legal-
ized aliens, coupled with the chain migration of their families, will
increase the future size and geographic concentration of the United
States population beyond what would otherwise exist. These mi-
grants will contribute their labor skills and purchasing power to an
American economy that increasingly needs them-especially if em-
ployer sanctions prove to be effective. Most of the newly-legalized
will be Mexicans. Although Mexicans tend to naturalize at lower
rates than other groups, those who do naturalize will acquire citizen-
ship and voting power, thereby altering the balance of political
forces in their local communities and regions. Emerging from the
shadows of their illegal status, they will be freer to openly affirm
their traditions, languages, and values.
These developments present American society with great oppor-
tunities and great dangers. The opportunities are obvious: social
invigoration, faster population growth, a more dynamic and com-
petitive economy, and an increasingly cosmopolitan perspective on
the interdependent world beyond our borders. The dangers are
perhaps less obvious because they are often more diffuse: cultural
and linguistic fragmentation, displacement of low-income workers
in some local labor markets, a renewed spur to nativist impulses,
and a less cohesive national identity. If past is prologue, immigra-
tion law and policy in the 1990s will be profoundly controversial,
far-reaching and revealing of the type of society that we aspire to be.
Immigration law and policy will mirror America even as they trans-
form her.
